Abstract. We study two-person stochastic games on a Polish state and compact action spaces and with average payoff criterion under a certain ergodicity condition. For the zero-sum game we establish the existence of a value and stationary optimal strategies for both players. For the nonzero-sum case the existence of Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies is established under certain separability conditions.
Introduction
We study noncooperative stochastic games on uncountable state and action spaces, and with ergodic or limiting average payoff. Although there is a vast literature on general state Markov decision processes (MDP) with average payoff criterion, the corresponding results on stochastic games seem to be very limited. For finite or countable state space there are several papers, e.g., [10] , [22] , [4] , [15] , [8] , and [5] . Uncountable state and action spaces arise quite often in practical problems. When the planning horizon is infinite, two usual payoff criteria that are treated are discounted payoff and limiting average (ergodic) payoff. In many applications, the ergodic payoff criterion is more realistic than the discounted one because the former represents a limiting time average while the latter involves a discount factor which may be difficult to evaluate. From a mathematical point of view, the discounted case is comparatively easier to analyse since the discount factor takes care of the asymptotic behavior of the state process. On the other hand, without some stability property of the state process it is difficult to handle the ergodic case and therefore this case is much more involved. There are several papers on the uncountable state stochastic game with discounted payoff. For example, the twoperson zero-sum case has been studied by Maitra and Parthasarathy [14] , and by Kumar and Shiau [13] . For the nonzero-sum case, the existence of Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies is a challenging problem and is still open. For finite action spaces Himmelberg et al. [12] and Parthasarathy [20] have established the existence of Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies under a certain separability condition on the reward functions and transition kernel. Parthasarathy and Sinha [21] have obtained the same existence results under the assumption that the transition law is independent of the initial state. Mertens and Parthasarathy [16] have proved the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium for general state and action spaces. Amir [1] has established the existence of equilibrium in Markov strategies for finite action spaces. Recently Nowak and Raghaven [18] have proved the existence of correlated equilibrium in stationary strategies for general state and action spaces under very general conditions In [9] we have studied the stochastic game problem on a Polish state space and compact action space and with average payoff criterion. We have studied both the zero-sum and nonzero-sum cases.
Under certain conditions we have established the existence of saddle point equilibrium for the zero-sum case and Nash equilibrium for the nonzero-sum case in stationary strategies. Nowak [19] has established the existence of correlated equilibrium in stationary strategies for the average payoff criterion for Borel state space and compact action space. He has used a certain geometric ergodicity condition to obtain the equilibrium. Under further separability conditions on the transition law and payoff functions he has also established the existence of Nash equilibrium for the average payoff case. Thus the results for the nonzero-sum case in [9] and [19] are similar, although the methodology and proofs are quite different. In [19] Nowak has employed the vanishing discount method to obtain the equilibrium, i.e., first he has used the existence of equilibrium for the discounted case from [18] and then he has let the discount factor go to one to obtain the corresponding result for the average payoff case. On the contrary, in [9] the optimality equation for the average case is directly used to obtain the Nash equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge the zero-sum case for the average payoff criterion for the uncountable state space has not been treated in the literature before [9] .
In this paper which is a revised version of [9] , we first study the zero-sum game. Under a certain ergodicity assumption we establish the existence of a value and stationary optimal strategies for both players for the ergodic payoff criterion. We then study the value iteration scheme and develop algorithms for finding optimal strategies for both players. For the nonzero-sum case, we assume the same ergodicity conditions together with separability on reward functions and transition kernel. Under these conditions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and contains some preliminaries. Section 3 deals with the zero-sum game. Nash equilibrium for the nonzero-sum game is treated in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper with some remarks.
Notation and Preliminaries
A two-person stochastic game is determined by six objects X, U, V, r 1 , r 2 , q , where X is the state space, assumed to be a Polish space. U and V are action spaces of players 1 and 2, respectively, assumed to be compact metric spaces. r 1 : X ×U × V → R, i = 1, 2, is the one-stage payoff function for player i, assumed to be bounded and continuous. q: X ×U ×V → P(X ) (the space of probability measures on X endowed with the topology of weak convergence) is the transition law, assumed to be continuous (in the topology of weak convergence). The game is played as follows. At each stage (time) players observe the current state x ∈ X of the system and then players 1 and 2 independently choose actions u ∈ U , v ∈ V , respectively. As a result of this two things happen:
(ii) the system moves to a new state x with the distribution q(· | x, u, v).
The whole process then repeats from the new state x . Payoff accumulates throughout the course of the game. The planning horizon or total number of stages is infinite, and each player wants to maximize his time average payoff.
At each stage the players choose their actions independently on the basis of past information. The available information for decision making at time t ∈ N := {0, 1, 2, . . .} is given by the history of the process up to that time
∞ are the history spaces. A strategy for player 1 is a sequence π 1 = {π
The set of all strategies for player 1 is denoted by 1 . A strategy π 1 ∈ 1 is called a Markov strategy if
Thus a Markov strategy for player 1 can be identified with a sequence of measurable maps
A stationary strategy is called deterministic or pure of : X → U . Let M 1 , S 1 ,and D 1 denote the set of Markov, stationary, and deterministic strategies for player 1, respectively. The strategies for player 2 are defined similarly. Let 2 , M 2 , S 2 , and D 2 denote the set of arbitrary, Markov, stationary, and deterministic strategies for player 2, respectively.
Given an initial distribution µ ∈ P(X ) and a pair of strategies (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ 1 × 2 , the corresponding state and action processes {X t }, {U t }, {V t } are stochastic processes defined on the canonical space (
is uniquely determined by π 1 , π 2 , and µ by Ionescu Tulcea's theorem [3] . The corresponding expectation is denoted by E
Note that the processes X t , U t , V t will satisfy:
and
Notice that (4) reflects the fact that at each stage the actions are chosen independently and hence the processes U t and V t are conditionally independent given the past history. For a pair of stationary strategies ( , ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , the corresponding state process {X t } is a Markov process with stationary transition probabilities P[ , ] given by
For ϕ ∈ P(U ), ψ ∈ P(V ), we use the notation
A pair of stationary strategies ( , ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 is called stable if the corresponding state process {X i } is ergodic, i.e., it has a unique invariant measure denoted as η[ , ] ∈ P(X ) and
in P(X ) as T → ∞ for any x ∈ X , where
(x)) denotes the t-step transition function under ( , ).
Let (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ 1 × 2 and let (X t , U t , V t ) be the corresponding process with X 0 = x ∈ X . The ergodic payoff for player i, i = 1, 2, is defined as
A pair of strategies (π * 1 , π * 2 ) is called a Nash equilibrium (for the ergodic payoff criterion) if
Our aim is to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium (
In this case a Nash equilibrium is often referred to as a saddle-point equilibrium. More generally, let r = r 1 = −r 2 , and L(π
for anyπ 2 ∈ 2 . A strategy π * 2 ∈ 2 is called optimal for player 2 if, for any x ∈ X ,
for anyπ 1 ∈ 1 . The game has a value if
for any x ∈ X . Note that if (π * 1 , π * 2 ) is a saddle-point equilibrium, then π * i is an optimal strategy for player i, i = 1, 2, and the game has a value. Our aim is to establish the existence of a value and stationary optimal strategies for each player.
We subsequently assume an ergodic condition under which all ( , ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 will be stable. We then denote
Note that under such a condition
for any x ∈ X . We can also consider a "pathwise" ergodic payoff, i.e., the right-hand side of (10) with E
deleted. Player i wants to a.s. maximize lim inf
The notation of pathwise equilibrium and optimal strategies are analogous. Pathwise solutions, apart from yielding mathematically stronger results, are useful in many practical applications, since we often deal with only one realization; in this case the expectation may not be appropriate in the payoff function. Under our ergodicity assumption, to be made later, a pair ( , ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , (16) will be a.s. equal to ρ i [ , ] and the usual solutions and pathwise solutions will coincide. Therefore we do not distinguish the two payoff concepts. We denote by B(X ) and C b (X ) the Banach spaces of bounded measurable and bounded continuous functions on X respectively with sup norm.
Zero-Sum Game
In this section we study the zero-sum case. We carry out our study under the following ergodicity assumption:
where the supremum is over all x, x ∈ X , ϕ, ϕ ∈ P(U ), ψ, ψ ∈ P(V ) and · TV denotes the total variation norm. 
Also,
for any f ∈ B(X ).
Proof. We can closely mimic the proof of Lemma 3.3 on p. 57 of [11] to draw the desired conclusions. We omit the details.
In the next lemma we present a set of sufficient conditions which imply (A1). The proof closely follows that of Lemma 3.3 on p. 57 of [11] and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 3.2. The following two conditions separately imply (A1)(i):
(i) There exists a measure µ on X such that
(ii) There exists a measure ν on X such that
Example 3.3. Let ( , F, P) be a probability space and let {W t } be a sequence of independent N (0, 1) (N (a, b) denotes the Gaussian distribution with mean a and variance b) random variables. Let U, V ⊂ R be compact sets. Let f : R × U × V → R, g: R → R be bounded continuous functions with g(·) > 0. Let the state process be given by the following difference equation:
where U t , V t are action processes. Then
Since f is bounded we can easily find a nontrivial measure µ (in fact we can choose µ to be equivalent to the Lebesque measure on R) such that
In view of Lemma 3.2, condition (A1) is satisfied. This example can easily be extended to multidimensional state space. Many pursuitevasion games in discrete time can be modeled after (20) . The existence of a value and optimal strategies are usually derived from the solution of appropriate dynamic programming (or Shapley) equations. For the ergodic payoff criterion the Shapley equations are
A solution to (21) is a pair (ρ, v) satisfying (21) where ρ is a scalar and v ∈ C b (X ) (one can choose v ∈ B(X ) also). We have the following standard result.
be a solution of (21) . Then:
then * is an optimal strategy for player 1 and * is an optimal strategy for player 2. Under our assumption such * , * always exist.
For any
if and only if
(iv) If (π 1 , π 2 ) satisfies (24) then it is a pair of optimal strategies for both players.
Proof. Let π 2 ∈ 2 be arbitrary and let * ∈ S 1 be as in (22) . The existence of such a * is guaranteed by a standard measurable selection theorem, e.g. Lemma 1 in [2] . Let {X t } be the corresponding state process with initial condition X 0 = x. By (22) we have
Now,
Therefore,
Taking expectation, dividing by T , and letting T → ∞, we obtain
Hence ρ * ≤ sup
for any x ∈ X . Similarly, it can be shown that
for any x ∈ X . Therefore it follows that ρ * is the value of the game, * is an optimal strategy for player 1, and * is an optimal strategy for player 2. This proves (i) and (ii). (iii) can be proved by using similar steps and the martingale stability theorem, see Chapter 3 of [11] . (iv) follows from (iii).
In view of the above theorem, we look forward to establishing the existence of a solution to (21) in R × C b (X ). Indeed, under (A1) such a result will be proved. We use the span-contraction method to achieve this. The idea dates back to Tijms [23] and Federgruen and Tijms [7] in the context of MDP; see Chapter 3 of [11] for an excellent presentation.
Definition 3.5. Let v ∈ B(X ). The span seminorm of v is defined as
Let T : B(X ) → B(X ). We say that T is a span-contraction if, for some β ∈ [0, 1),
Clearly, sp(v) = 0 if and only if v = constant. We introduce the following equivalence relation ∼ in B(X ). We say that v 1 ∼ v 2 if and only if v 1 − v 2 = constant. Let B(X ) = B(X )/ ·, the quotient space endowed with the quotient norm ∼ . If T : B(X ) → B(X ) is a span-contraction, then it is easily seen that the canonically induced map T : B(X ) → B(X ) is a contraction and thus has a unique fixed point. It then follows that T itself has a span-fixed point, i.e., there exists a function v ∈ B(X ) such that sp(T v − v) = 0 or equivalently T v − v = constant, and any two such fixed points must differ by some constant.
Let
Using the (weak) continuity of g(· | ·, ·, ·) and the fact that U and V and hence P(U ) and P(V ) are compact metric spaces, it is not difficult to see that
Lemma 3.6. Under (A1), T is a span-contraction on C b (X ).
Proof.
From (27) and (28), it follows that, for any x, x ∈ X ,
where
. It can be shown as in Lemma 3.5 p. 59 of [11] that, for any v ∈ C b (X ) and for any finite signed measure µ,
Applying (30) to (29) and using (A1), it follows that, for any x, x ∈ X ,
where α < 1 is as in (A1).
Since (31) is true, for all x, x ∈ X , it follows that
Theorem 3.7. Let x 0 ∈ X be arbitrary. Then under (A1) there exists a unique solution
Proof. By Lemma 3.6, T : (26) is a span-contraction. Therefore there exists a v ∈ C b (X ) and a constant ρ * ∈ R such that
Let (ρ , v ) be another solution of (21) satisfying v (x 0 ) = 0. Then clearly v is also a span-fixed point of T . Hence v
Based on the above existence results, we now develop the value iteration scheme to obtain uniform approximations to ρ * . This extends the result of Federgruen and Tijms [7] to the present problem. Our presentation closely follows Chapter 3 of [11] , therefore we omit proofs in several places. Throughout we assume (A1). We define the value iteration functions v t ∈ C b (X ) as follows: v 0 ∈ C b (X ) is arbitrary, and
where T is as defined in (26). It can be easily seen that v t is the value function for the game with the length of horizon being t and v 0 is the terminal reward. Let { 0 } ∈ M 1 and { t } ∈ M 2 be such that for each
We say that { t } and { t } are value iterations for players 1 and 2, respectively. We will show that these strategies are optimal for the players. We define a sequence of functions
where (v * , ρ * ) is as Theorem 3.7. Then, for each x ∈ X ,
where D(x, ϕ, ψ) is as in (23) .
Lemma 3.8. Let α < 1 be as in (A1). Then:
Let ( * , * ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 be as in (22) . Then D(x, ϕ, * (x)) ≤ 0 for any ϕ ∈ P(U ) and D(x, * (x), ψ) ≥ 0 for any ψ ∈ P(V ). Thus from (36) it follows that, for each x ∈ X , Similarly it can be shown that t+1 (x) ≥ − t . Hence, 
is nonincreasing and V
− t is nondecreasing and both converge exponentially fast to ρ * . More precisely, for all t ≥ 1
for each t, and V
− t ≤ ρ( , ) ≤ V + t when ( , ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 is such that = t , = t
for the fixed but arbitrary t, t , t are as in (33). Moreover,
is an optimal strategy for player 1 and { t } ∈ M 2 is an optimal strategy for player 2.
Proof. In view of Lemma 3.8, the proof of Theorem 4.8 on p. 64 of [11] can be closely mimicked to draw the desired conclusions.
Remark 3.10. From (iii) above it follows that, for large t, t ∈ S 1 , t ∈ S 2 give nearly optimal strategies for both players. This theorem can readily provide algorithms for finding optimal strategies for both players. This extends the well-known results in MDP to the stochastic game.
Remark 3.11. We can also extend the successive averaging to our case. For t ≥ 1, set
ψ) .(38)
As in the proof of Lemma 3.6, one can show that
Then the following result can easily be proved.
Corollary 3.12.
Nonzero Sum Game
In this section we establish the existence of a pair of stationary equilibrium strategies for a nonzero-sum game. To this end we first strengthen our earlier assumptions.
(A2) q: X × U × V → P(X ) is strongly continuous, i.e., continuous in the total variation norm (here P(X ) is regarded as a subset of the space of finite signed measures on X ). (A3) There exists two substochastic kernels
(A4) The reward functions r i , i = 1, 2, are separable in action variables, i.e., there exist bounded continuous functions
such that
Throughout this section we assume (A1) as well. First we give an example where our assumptions ((A1)-(A3)) are satisfied.
Example 4.1. Let U, V ⊂ R be compact. Let
be bounded continuous, F, P) is the basic probability space) such that, for each t ∈ N,
Let {X t } be a real-valued process given by
X 0 = x ∈ R, where u t ∈ U , v t ∈ V are actions chosen by the players. We analyse (40) in two cases:
Then it is easily seen that
. Since f i , g i are bounded and continuous, it is easy to see that q satisfies all our assumptions.
(ii) Let R + = {x ∈ R | x ≥ 0} and R − = {x ∈ R | x < 0}. Let 1 (t) = {ω:
). Clearly, q satisfies all our assumptions. These two cases can be extended to higher dimensions. Also, since f i , g i are quite general, many problems of practical interest can be modeled after these. This is particularly true in economic systems. In an economic organization with two decision makers, suppose that only one decision maker is allowed by a higher authority to take action depending on the current economic state of the organization. The evolution of the state will then follow (40) so that assumption (A3) is satisfied
The following result, which will be repeatedly used in what follows, is proved in [1] . Lemma 4.2. Under (A2) there exists a µ ∈ P(X ) such that q (· | x, u, v) µ for all x ∈ X , u ∈ U , v ∈ V . This µ will be used throughout. Let h: X × U × V × X → R + be the Radon-Nikodym derivative of q(· | x, u, v) with respect to µ. We assume that
Then under (A2) and (A5), for each x,
Proof. The pointwise convergence follows from (A2) in view of Lemma 4.2. The uniformity of the convergence in u, v can be proved using (A5), see Lemma 3.1 of [17] .
We now proceed to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies.
The under (A1), by the results of Chapter 3 of [11] for each x,
In fact under (A1) the above suprema can be replaced by maxima. Thus there exists
(See [3] .) Let
Let ( * 1 , * 2 ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 realize the maxima in (41) and (42). Then * 1 (resp. * 2 ) is an optimal response of player 1 (resp. player 2) given player 2 (resp. player 1) employs 2 (resp. 1 ). Fix an x 0 ∈ X . Let v 1 [ 2 ] : X → R be defined as 
Then v *
The following result can be proved using the well-known result in MDP (the techniques of Section 3 can be used to supply the details). 
We first show that τ is upper semicontinuous. Let 2 ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 obviously forms a µ-equilibrium one (i.e., (11) holding in a set of µ-measure 1). Then by a construction analogous to Theorem 1 of [20] the existence of the desired Nash equilibrium follows.
Conclusion
We have established the existence of saddle-point equilibrium in stationary strategies under a geometric ergodicity condition. However for Nash equilibrium we have imposed further separability conditions on rewards and transition kernels. An interesting open problem is to establish a similar existence result without such separability conditions. For Nash equilibrium we have treated the two-person game for notational convenience. The result can easily be extended to an N -person game. Also, our result can be extended to the Borel state and action spaces under some additional assumptions.
